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Non-technical Summary
The communication policy of central banks attracts a lot of attention from financial
markets. For the ECB in particular with its complex two pillar strategy and its definition
of price stability, it is crucial that the public understands monetary policy decisions and
strategy. The literature so far stresses mostly the influence on interest rates and exchanges
rates. However, the impact of communication on inflation expectations is also important
to understand.
We contribute to the literature by investigating the influence of the informational content
of the ECB Presidents’ statements on inflation expectations. Because both measures,
communication and expectations, are not directly observable, we have to approximate
the respective variables. Communication is measured by an indicator that captures the
informational content of the monthly introductory statements of the ECB president ex-
plaining interest rate decisions by aggregating the frequency of phrases used in this highly
standardised communication devise. For inflation expectations, the qualitative answers
of financial market experts regarding the question of an expected change of inflation in
the next six months posed in the ZEW Financial Market Test are transformed in a quan-
titative measure of inflation expectations. The analysed time period is February 1999 to
June 2007.
An influence of communication on inflation expectations is possible in two ways. First, the
gap between realised and expected inflation can be influenced by the rhetoric of the central
bank. Second, the communication could directly influence the expectations formation
process. As the results show, there is a significant influence of the wording indicator on
inflation expectations whereas the impact on the gap between inflation expectations and
realised inflation does not seem to be robust. A possible interpretation is that the rhetoric
of the ECB communicates risks to price stability in a credible way and that financial
market experts react to the announcements by adjusting their inflation expectations in
the short run. The influence arises because the indicator seems to summarise information
that would otherwise be provided by different macroeconomic variables that are publicly
available.
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Abstract
The communication policy of the European Central Bank attracts a lot of at-
tention from financial markets. This paper analyses the informational content of
the monthly introductory statements of the ECB president explaining interest rate
decisions with regard to inflation expectations of financial market experts for the
euro area from February 1999 to June 2007. Estimations are conducted for the in-
fluence of ECB communication on expectations formation besides other macroeco-
nomic variables. As the results indicate, the indicator measuring the informational
content of ECB rhetoric contributes to the explanation of inflation expectations
formation.
JEL Classification: E52, E58, D83, D84
Key Words: inflation expectations formation, central bank communication,
Carlson-Parkin method, survey expectations
∗Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim, ‘WIN-Kolleg’ of the Heidelberg Academy
of Sciences; address: P.O. Box 10 34 43, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany; Phone: +49/612/1235-145, Fax
+49/612/1235-223; ullrich@zew.de. I would like to thank the participants of the DIW Institut Seminar,
Berlin, 02 May 2006, the participants of the De Nederlandsche Bank Research Seminar, Amsterdam, 19
October 2006, in particular my discussant Carin van der Cruijsen, the participants of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank and ZEW Conference ”Relation between Monetary Policy and Financial Markets”, Mannheim,
23-24 November 2006, in particular my discussant Christina Gerberding, Timo Wollmersha¨user and
Michael Schro¨der for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction
The transparency of monetary policy and the communication policy of central banks
are gaining weight in discussions about good monetary policy because both measures
influence the effectiveness of monetary policy by providing information for the public. The
assumption is that a heightened transparency increases monetary policy effectiveness. If,
for instance, interest rates are close to zero, the leeway for actual policy decisions is limited
and communication would play an important role in influencing expectations. Also, under
normal circumstances, transparency helps to improve the transmission of monetary policy
impulses. Transparency enables financial markets to interpret the monetary signals of the
central bank in a correct manner, as it provides markets with the necessary information
and the possibility to learn the central bank’s strategy, the central bank’s interpretation
of a changing economic environment, and the respective policy reactions. In this manner,
the central bank influences expectations formation of private agents. Moreover, the ability
to influence expectations provides the link between the short-term interest rate, which the
central bank can influence more or less directly, and the long-term interest rates, asset
prices, and exchange rates. Furthermore, inflation expectations play a crucial role in
determining wage and price setting.
We investigate the influence of the European Central Bank (ECB) communication on
inflation expectations of experts. Communication as well as inflation expectations are not
directly observable but have to be approximated. To measure the informational content
of communication, we concentrate on the ECB press conferences following the Governing
Council meetings where decisions about the interest rate are taken. These statements
are complemented by analysing the editorial of the ECB Monthly Bulletins for those
months in which no statements are given. To measure the informational content of ECB
statements, a variant of the wording indicator of Heinemann and Ullrich (2007) is used.
We assume that the statements and the Monthly Bulletins are sources of information that
are intended for the informed public – central bank watchers in the broader sense. Since
financial market experts watch the central bank very closely, we would expect that an
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influence on their expectations formation is more likely than an influence on expectations
of consumers, for example.
To measure expert inflation expectations, we use data from the ZEW Financial Markets
Test. The qualitative answers of experts with regard to the development of inflation in
the following six months in the euro area are transformed into quantitative inflation ex-
pectations using the standard Carlson-Parkin method (Carlson and Parkin 1975) with
asymmetric but constant thresholds which are also results from the survey. To investi-
gate the influence of the wording indicator we rely on two approaches. The estimation
equations are based on a theoretical setup that relies on a model by Svensson (2003)
explaining why communication should have an impact on inflation expectations. First,
we estimate the influence of the indicator on the difference between inflation and inflation
expectations. In a second approach, we explicitly model expectations formation as partly
forward-looking and partly backward-looking. For the forward-looking part, we use a
set of explanatory variables including the wording indicator to capture the influence of
different macroeconomic variables on inflation expectations.
The estimation results allow for the conclusion that the ECB statements given at the
press conferences following the interest rate decisions influence inflation expectations of
experts. If the rhetoric communicating concern about inflation risks is rather hawkish,
financial market experts are induced to adjust inflation expectations with a six month
horizon upwards. At the same time, the decisions of the ECB do not seem to have an
impact on expectations formation. It is most likely that the time horizon of six months
is too short to capture the effects of interest rate decisions on inflation and therefore
on inflation expectations. The ECB does not only rely on interest rate decisions to
reveal information to the public but also provides information via communication and
increasing transparency of monetary policy in this way. See e.g. Gosselin et al. (2006) for
a theoretical rationale of such central bank behaviour. However, the ECB communication
could be seen as a summary measure of other macroeconomic variables that influence
expectations formation.
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We proceed as follows: First, we give a short motivation arising from gaps in the existing
literature regarding communication of the ECB. The two crucial time series, inflation
expectations and the wording indicator to measure the informational content of ECB
rhetoric are introduced in section three. There is a broad theoretical literature taking
into account transparency, but a common model to include communication seems to be
missing to our knowledge. For this reason, we use Svensson’s model (2003) to motivate a
rationale for the effects of communication on inflation expectations in the fourth section.
In section five, the relationship between expected and realised inflation is empirically
investigated. The sixth section deals with the explicit expectations formation and the
respective estimation results. The last section concludes.
2 Motivation
The amount of literature dealing with central bank communication issues is growing fast.
One strand of the literature deals with the influence on the exchange rate (e.g. Jansen and
de Haan 2005 for an overview, Jansen and de Haan 2007), and, more generally, on financial
markets and the predictability of monetary policy decisions (Bernoth and von Hagen 2004,
Gaspar et al. 2001, Hartmann et al. 2001). Ross (2002) concludes that the Fed and the
Bank of England are more predictable than the ECB whereas Connolly and Kohler (2004)
come to the conclusion that the predictability of monetary policy of the Fed, the Bank
of England, and the ECB is similar. Furthermore, there are some investigations directly
concerned with the communication policy of the ECB (e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007,
Gerlach 2004, Heinemann and Ullrich 2007 and Jansen and de Haan 2006).
The transparency and communication of central banks not only influences the expectations
of agents in financial markets regarding the next interest rate decision. Sellon (2004)
describes the impact of central bank behaviour and communication on the term structure
of interest rates, on the link between short-term and long-term rates and the different
reactions of the rates on policy rate changes depending on the maturity of the rates. In
addition to this, inflation expectations are also influenced.
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The monetary strategy of inflation targeting is also connected with the provision of ex-
tensive information and with transparency. Kuttner and Posen (1999) investigate the
link between inflation expectations and inflation targeting coupled with more communi-
cation in the UK, Canada, and New Zealand. However, the analysis does not rely on
direct measures of inflation expectations but rather employs indirect approaches such as
the Taylor rule and the time series properties of inflation rates. CzogaÃla et al. (2005)
analyse the influence of the communication policy of the Polish central bank on corpo-
rate inflation expectations without explicitly incorporating a measure for communication
into the estimations. Instead, they relate the econometric findings with regard to the
rationality of expectations formation to the communication policy of the National Bank
of Poland. Kliesen and Schmid (2004) take a closer look at the influence of surprises in
macroeconomic data releases, monetary policy surprises and central bank communication
of the Federal Reserve on inflation expectations. The inflation expectations are gathered
from concepts of inflation compensation included in nominal Treasury securities and in-
flation indexed Treasury securities. Communication measured as an indicator variable
for days when communication is priced in the market reduces the uncertainty of future
inflation rates measured as the volatility of the series. Kohn and Sack (2003) find that
communication matters as much as policy actions for the Federal Reserve in the longer
run by altering the perceptions of the central bank’s economic outlook. Although private
agents may have the same information available with regard to the future development
of economic variables, central bank forecasts seem to be superior to those of the private
sector (Romer and Romer 2000). Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007) investigate the
influence of central bank transparency on inflation expectations.
As this short overview shows, there are a number of empirical studies investigating the
influence of communication on financial markets and the predictability of interest rate de-
cisions. However, the impact on inflation expectations formation needs further analysis,
especially for the ECB. Whereas the empirical investigations seem to have a clear un-
derstanding about the concept of communication, the theoretical meaning is not equally
clear and cannot easily be distinguished from transparency. Theoretical modelling is dom-
inated by transparency issues (Geraats 2002, Neumann 2002). Transparency is regarded
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as a multidimensional concept which includes the presentation and explanation of the ob-
jectives, methods, forecasts, models, tactics, and decisions of a central bank (Blinder et al.
2001) and communication can be treated as an integral part of it (Winkler 2002). Since
transparency means openness and clarity, the mere presentation of data is not sufficient
to achieve a common understanding, the ultimate objective of genuine transparency. In
this sense, communication not only provides quantitative information. The more artic-
ulated information plays a crucial role (Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti 2004, p. 17). An
analysis that comes close to providing a rationale for communication in monetary policy
is Svensson (2003). He introduces a judgment factor of the central bank with regard to
potentially unobservable components of the economy into a model to analyse reaction
functions of monetary policy. We make use of this analysis to develop a basis for the
empirical investigation.
3 The Measures of Inflation Expectations and Cen-
tral Bank Communication
3.1 Inflation Expectations of Experts
Since the analysis of inflation expectations is the focus of this paper, we describe the
expectations series in more detail (see also Heinemann and Ullrich 2006). The series is
generated on the basis of the ZEW Financial Market Survey that is conducted every
month. Financial market experts working mostly in the financial, research, and economic
departments or the investment and securities departments of their companies are asked to
assess the current economic situation and voice their expectations with regard to various
macroeconomic variables. Since February 1999, one question refers to inflation expecta-
tions of the euro area. The experts are asked whether ‘The annual inflation rate in the
general economy in the medium term (6 months) will increase/not change/decrease/don’t
know’.
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To quantify these expectations, we follow a standard variant of the probability approach
pioneered by Carlson and Parkin (1975). The starting point of the approach is the as-
sumption that every individual bases her answer on a subjective probability distribution
for inflation rates given the knowledge contained in her information set. The expected
inflation rate is identical to the conditional expected value of the distribution. If the
expected inflation rate exceeds a certain threshold the answer is ‘increase’ and if the ex-
pected inflation falls below a threshold it is ‘decrease’ and the space in between shows
the indifference interval resulting in a ‘no change’-answer. The ‘don’t know category’ is
simply ignored. The thresholds distinguishing the categories stem from the ZEW survey
itself which were polled in January 2006. The answer categories allow for asymmetric
thresholds. For the calculation of the inflation expectations series, the mean value of the
answers is used and is given at −0.24 percentage points for the lower threshold and at
0.22 percentage points for the upper threshold.
For the calculation we assume that the subjective probability distributions are indepen-
dent of one another and have the same known form across individuals. Thus, the propor-
tion of ‘rise’ answers is identical to the probability that inflation in six months exceeds
the upper threshold and the proportion of the ‘decrease’ answers corresponds to the prob-
ability that the future inflation rate falls below the lower threshold conditional to the
information set at the time expectations are formed. The quantification depends on the
chosen form of the aggregate distribution function. For the calculation we use a standard
normal distribution following a number of examples in the literature on transforming
qualitative survey data (see Mitchell 2002 or Berk 1999). From the survey results we
obtain the expected change of inflation for the following six months,
∆epit+6|t =
−art+6|t + bft+6|t
ft+6|t − rt+6|t (1)
where a denotes the lower threshold and b the upper threshold (Smith and McAleer 1995).
The variables rt+6|t = φ−1(1 − Rt+6|t) and ft+6|t = φ−1(Ft+6|t) are the inverse of the
cumulative standard normal distribution of the share of experts expecting a fall (Ft+6|t)
or a rise (Rt+6|t) in inflation. In addition to the ZEW thresholds, we use the thresholds
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from Henzel and Wollmersha¨user (2005, 338) that are based on a time-varying calculation
of the indifference limen based on the Weber Fechner-Law as a robustness check:
lower threshold: at = −0.14− 0.15pit (2)
upper threshold: bt = 0.32 + 0.13pit. (3)
Since the above calculation (1) gives the absolute expected change, we assume that infla-
tion expectations can be gathered from the following equation:
pit+6|t = p˜it +∆epit+6|t (4)
where p˜i denotes perceived inflation. To approximate perceived inflation, we use the
inflation rate published in the latest ECB Monthly Bulletin as the last publicly known
inflation rate. This induces a publication lag of two months until October 2001 and of
one month afterwards. The resulting expectations series with constant thresholds is very
similar to actual inflation (see Figure 1). Experts do not expect inflation six months
ahead to deviate a great deal from actual inflation. This is reasonable given that the
Euro area inflation rate moves around two percent, the definition of price level stability of
the ECB. In addition to this, the standard deviation of the expectations based on constant
thresholds is lower than the standard deviation of the expectations series that is based
on variable thresholds. The variance of the latter is almost as high as that of the actual
inflation series.
3.2 Measurement of ECB Communication
To empirically investigate the influence of communication on expectations formation, the
informational content of the ECB communication has to be measured. We restrict the
analysis to the introductory statement of the ECB president given at the monthly ECB
press conferences. There are different ways of capturing the meaning of the ECB rhetoric.
We rely on a variant of the wording indicator of Heinemann and Ullrich (2007).1 The
construction period of the indicator, wd, covers the period of January 1999 to December
2001 ensuring that the first interest rate cycle for the euro area is included.
1For a similar approach to counting words, see Cecchetti (2003).
7
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
Inflation expectations formed in t-6 for t (variable thresholds)
Inflation expectations formed in t-6 for t (constant thresholds)
Inflation rate known in t
pe
rc
en
t
Figure 1: The series of the inflation rate and the two inflation expectations series.
First, we use a list of phrases that potentially signal the information which the central
bank intends to disseminate to the public (see Tables 4 for the phrases). To this list,
the length of the statements is added. The frequency of occurrence of these phrases are
counted in the introductory statements of the ECB president, explaining interest rate
decisions in the press conference given after the Council meetings. For months in which
no meeting takes place, the editorial of the ECB Monthly Bulletin is used, which is very
similar in terms of structure and content to the introductory statements. The recourse
to the Bulletin takes place in August of the years 1999 to 2005 and in January 2001.
In some months two press conferences are held, that are taken into account separately
for the calculation (March 2000, October 2000, and June 2001). The statement of 30
August 2001 is used as the September 2001 statement. Then, the statements are grouped
according to the direction of the interest rate change in the next month assuming that
the statements prepare these decisions and communicate the bank’s economic assessment
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and expectations to the public. In order to determine whether the use of the phrases has
the potential to convey information to the public, we test whether the average frequency
of the phrases is different in the month before rising, decreasing or unchanged interest
rates. If the test indicates differences in frequencies at least at the 10 percent level, the
phrase is a candidate to be included in the indicator formation (see Table 4 for the test
results).
In a second step, pair-wise F-tests are conducted to determine the actual inclusion and
the sign of the phrase when calculating the indicator (see Table 5 for the test results). A
positive sign is attributed to those words for which tests show significantly larger frequen-
cies in tightening compared to easing periods, tightening compared to neutral periods, or
in neutral compared to easing periods. A negative sign is assigned to words where the
significant relative frequencies are opposite. If the word is most often used in months
before unchanged interest rates, it is not included in the calculation. Thus, the resulting
indicator is, by construction, positively associated with an increasing ‘hawkishness’ of
ECB rhetoric. Next, the informational content of a phrase is determined by using the η2
statistic that gives the share of the total variance attributable to differences in frequency
means between the three different categories.
Summing up, the wording indicator wd is constructed using the standardised frequency
of phrases as follows:
wdt =
k∑
i=1
nobs(phrasei,t)−meanobs(phrasei)
stdv(xi)
sign(phrasei)η
2(phrasei). (5)
Figure 2 shows the indicator together with the interest rate. The indicator is assumed not
only to measure the informational content with regard to the explanation and preparation
of interest rate decisions, but also with regard to the ECB assessment of inflation risks.
Given that the mandate of the ECB is to first and foremost guarantee price stability
in the euro area, the central bank will react to inflationary pressure with rising interest
rates. Deflation would also be a violation of the ECB definition of price stability with
an inflation rate of below, but close to two percent based on the Harmonised Consumer
Price Index. A higher hawkishness in the rhetoric of the ECB would hint at inflationary
pressure identified by the central bank. If the expectations rise with higher hawkishness
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but do not react to decisions, this would indicate that the economic agents also see a
danger of rising inflation such as the central bank but are not confident that the ECB
can bring inflation back to target. To make a judgement in this respect, however, the
time horizon of expectations formation and the length of the transmission mechanism
have to be taken into account. If the central bank communicates inflation risks that have
an impact on inflation sooner than the effect of an interest decision would take place,
expectations formed with regard to the short time horizon would react to communication
but not to interest rate decisions. This is one reason why central banks are responsible
for keeping inflation on target in the medium and long run and do not react to short-term
developments that might influence short-run inflation expectations.
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Figure 2: The wording indicators wd (left axis) and the policy rate (right axis).
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4 Influence of Communication on Inflation Expecta-
tions
The influence of central bank communication on inflation expectations of private agents
can be explained in two different ways. First, we investigate the difference between in-
flation expectations and realised inflation that could be influenced by central bank com-
munication. Second, communication can directly effect the level of inflation expectations.
To show this, we rely on the model introduced by Svensson (2003). The relation between
the inflation expectations of private agents, pit+1|t, and realised inflation, pi, can be derived
from the backward-looking model that is described by the following equations:
pit+1 = pit + αxxt + αzzt+1 + ²t+1 (6)
where pi denotes the inflation rate, and x the output gap. In z, all other exogenous
influences that affect the inflation rate are collected. Demand is described by
xt = βxxt−1 + βzzt − βr(it−1 − pit|t−1 − r) + ηt (7)
where i denotes the policy rate, r the average real interest rate, and pit|t−1 are private sector
inflation expectations formed in t−1 with regard to inflation in t. In this backward-looking
model of the transmission mechanism, the central bank employs the following reaction
function based on a linear-quadratic loss function (Svensson 2003, p. 437)
it−1 = r + pi∗ +
[
1 +
1− c
αxβr
]
(pit,t−1 − pi∗) + βx
βr
xt−1 +
βz
βr
zt,t−1 +
1− c
αxβr
z˜t+1,t−1 (8)
where pi∗ denotes the inflation target, and zt+1,t−1 and z˜t+1,t−1 =
∑∞
s=0(δc)
szt+1+s,t−1 are
valuations of the central bank about the exogenous variables influencing inflation and the
output gap. The parameter c is the appropriate solution of the characteristic equation for
the determination of the interest rate rule (for a detailed description see Svensson 2003).
The judgement of the central bank therefore matters with respect to inflation and inflation
expectations two periods ahead. The inflation rate one period ahead is predetermined and
the gap between pit+1|t and pit+1 is only influenced by expectations errors, zt+1|t − zt+1,
and the shocks, ² and η.
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Since we are not interested in the solution of the model but in the estimation of the rela-
tionship between inflation rate and inflation expectations, we concentrate on the deriva-
tion of an equation for both variables that allow for a translation into an estimation
equation. We determine private sector inflation expectations in t − 1 for t + 1, pit+1|t−1,
where monetary policy decisions about the interest rate in t − 1 have a first impact
on the inflation rate, and, therefore, inflation expectations influence the inflation rate.
Correspondingly, the inflation rate pit+1 is determined. The difference between inflation
expectations of private agents and the inflation rate is thus given as
pit+1|t−1 − pit+1 = pit|t−1 − pit︸ ︷︷ ︸
autoregressive part
+ [(1− c) + αxβr]
(
pit,t−1 − pit,t−1|t−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gap between central bank and private inflation expectations
+ (1− c) (z˜t+1,t−1 − z˜t+1,t−1|t−1)+ αxβx(zt,t−1 − zt,t−1|t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expectations gap with regard to exogenous variables
+αz(zt+1|t−1 − zt−1) + αxβz(zt|t−1 − zt)− αxηt − ²t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
private sector expectation errors and shocks
(9)
where yt+s,t|t gives the expectations of private agents about the judgement of the central
bank on the variable y. When the information set of private agents differs from that of the
central bank, the evaluation of central bank expectations by private agents with regard
to inflation and the exogenous variables has an impact on the gap between inflation and
expectations. If the central bank and the private agents possess the same information
set and form expectations in the same way based on the underlying model, the difference
would be reduced to
pit+1|t−1 − pit+1 = pit|t−1 − pit + αz(zt+1|t−1 − zt+1) + αxβz(zt|t−1 − zt)− αxηt − ²t+1 (10)
consisting only of expectations errors and shocks.
The difference between expected and realised inflation is influenced by different expecta-
tions of the variable z. This variable plays a crucial role for the following analysis. In
z, exogenous variables are collected that influence supply and demand but are not nec-
essarily observable. The central bank assesses the future development of these variables
for monetary policy decisions and, therefore, the information set of the central bank is
expanded by these ‘judgement factors’. Judgement is necessary because the true model
of the economy is not known. As Lomax (2005) describes the role of the Bank of Eng-
land forecasts, formal economic models are always accompanied by judgement even if
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the framework of the judgement is based on models. However, the judgement of private
agents might be different from that of the central bank, e.g., because of using another
model of the economy. If the central bank could communicate its judgement on the model
of the economy as well as its inflation expectations and be economically transparent in
the classification of Geraats (2002), inflation and inflation expectations of private agents
would be more in line.
In the case of the forward-looking model and forward-looking expectations, the inflation
rate and inflation expectations are given by (Svensson 2003, 434, 435)
pit+1 = pi + δ(pit+2|t − pi) + αxt+1|t + αzt+1 + ηt+1 (11)
pit+1|t = pi + δ(pit+2|t − pi) + αxt+1|t + αzt+1|t (12)
where pi denotes average inflation. The output gap as well as private expectations about
the output gap depend on the private sector forecast of the interest rate. In the case of the
expectations for the following period, the central bank would credibly announce its interest
rate setting. But even if the expectations for the two periods ahead are formed, the general
mechanism would not change. Only private sector expectations matter. Even if private
sector expectations with regard to the interest rate would be incorrect, this would lead
to a difference between the expected and the realised output gap but would not influence
the gap between expected and realised inflation because expected and realised inflation
depend on private sector expectations in the same way. Therefore, the difference between
private agents’ expectations and central bank expectations does matter for the level of
the inflation rate and the level of inflation expectations, but not for the gap between the
two variables.
As the theoretical model shows, the influence of central bank communication on inflation
expectations can come from two different sources. For adaptive expectations, the com-
munication influences the gap between the inflation rate and inflation expectations. For
forward-looking expectations, the communication influences the level of inflation expec-
tations. These two approaches are employed in the remainder of the paper. First, the
difference between inflation and inflation expectations is analysed. Second, expectations
formation is directly estimated.
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Before presenting the estimation results, we address a problem that arises for modern
central banks following an inflation targeting strategy or a similar monetary strategy
that attempts to anchor inflation expectations. The inflation target replaces inflation
expectations in the long-run if expectations are firmly anchored at the aimed level of
inflation and the prices of the economy normally aggregating private information about
market conditions cannot fulfill their role of information aggregation anymore (Morris
and Shin 2005).2 However, the ECB emphasises that it does not follow direct inflation
targeting but rather a two pillar strategy taking into account a broad range of signals about
the economic stance. Nevertheless, the ECB announces a definition of price stability that
includes a numerical value for inflation that is considered appropriate. The value of below
but near two percent is set mainly to anchor inflation expectations. Given the anchoring
of inflation expectations, they should not respond to changes in the economic condition
in the middle to long run because a credible monetary policy would bring inflation back
to target (Levin, Natalucci, and Piger 2004).
In this case, a hypothesis of inflation expectations formation seems to be useless, since in-
flation expectations equal the numerical target of monetary policy. However, this should
only be applicable over a mid- to long-term horizon because the central bank will not
react to every (expected) change in inflation. Temporary violation of the inflation target
would not be counteracted by interest rate decisions. In this case, short-term inflation
expectations could deviate from target inflation even if medium- and long-term expecta-
tions are well anchored at the level of the inflation target. We would expect that inflation
expectations over a six month horizon are affected by the short-term behaviour of the
inflation rate.
2In contrast to these concerns, Orphanides and Williams (2003) find that the announcement of an
inflation target helps to focus inflation expectations and reduces costs of imperfect knowledge that could
otherwise lead to detoriations in stabilisation policies.
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4.1 The Relation between the Inflation Rate and Inflation Ex-
pectations
As the preceding analysis shows, inflation and inflation expectations differ because of
expectations errors and when the expectations of the central bank are not fully in line
with those of private agents. To translate equation (9) into an estimation equation, we
first have to be aware that the available expectations data have a time horizon of six
months. Even if the time horizon implied by the theoretical model is longer than six
months, it gives a reasonable structure to the estimation approach.
The theoretical model states that the difference between inflation expectations and re-
alised inflation is determined by an autoregressive part and a part that can be described as
the gap between central bank inflation expectations and the assessment of private agents
with regard to these central bank forecasts. The terms that follow sum up the difference
between central bank and private sector expectations with regard to the exogenous vari-
ables and the last part of the equation consists of a number of expectations errors and
shocks.
For the autoregressive part, we assume that we can approximate expectations for in-
flation five months ahead by using inflation expectations formed one period before,
pit+5|t ≈ pit+5|t−1 (see Do¨pke et al. 2005). In addition to this, we estimate the unre-
stricted model where the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is not bound to be
one. Expectations errors that account for the difference between the realisation of the
respective variable and the expectations of the private sector are assumed to be purely
random and are included into the error term of the estimation equation, ε.
The gap between central bank expectations concerning the exogenous component, z, and
private sector expectations with regard to these forecasts is assumed to be influenced by
communication efforts of the central bank. Given that we do not possess a communication
measure for different time horizons and contents, we approximate all differences by the
wording indicator known at the time of expectations formation. We use the indicator
of the same month in which expectations are formed because the ECB statements are
15
usually given at the beginning of the month. Besides direct communication via statements,
the interest rate decisions of the ECB reveal information as well (Gosselin, Lotz, and
Wyplosz 2006). To ensure that the wording indicator reflects communication policy and
does not capture the effects of interest rate decisions, we also include the policy rate into
the estimation.
Since the ECB does not publish its inflation forecasts on a monthly basis, the gap between
the expectations of private agents and that of the central bank has to be approximated
by a number of variables, vi, that help to forecast inflation. In addition to this, these
variables could help to explain the shocks present in the theoretical model. The estimation
equation adjusted for the six months expectations horizon thus results in
pit − pit|t−6 = a1(pit−1 − pit−1|t−7) + a2wdt−6 + a3it−6 +
∑
i
a3+ivi,t−6 + εt. (13)
The estimation equation (13) assumes that realised and expected inflation move together.
To test this assumption, we use a second specification. Given that the unit root could
not be rejected for inflation as well as expectations, we use this characteristic to estimate
a vector error correction model (VECM) of the two series treating all further explanatory
variables as exogenous. In this case, the estimation equations become:
∆pit = b1
[
pit−1 + cpit−1|t−7
]
+
7∑
i=1
b1+i∆pit−i +
7∑
i=1
b8+i∆pit−i|t−6−i
+b16wdt−6 + b17it−6 +
∑
i
b17+ivi,t−6 + ²t (14)
∆pit|t−6 = d1
[
pit−1 + cpit−1|t−7
]
+
7∑
i=1
d1+i∆pit−i +
7∑
i=1
b8+i∆pit−i|t−6−i
+d16wdt−6 + d17it−6 +
∑
i
d17+ivi,t−6 + εt (15)
The optimal lag length according to the Akaike as well as the Schwarz criterion is given
by seven lags for the inflation expectations determined with constant thresholds where
lag four does not pass the lag exclusion test and is therefore precluded from the final
specification. For the model based on inflation expectations with variable thresholds, the
two information criteria give diverging information for seven lags or just one lag. Using
the more extensive specification, the lag exclusion test indicates that lags two to four are
not needed, thus providing a more parsimonious specification of the equation.
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To determine the explanatory variables vi, we base our considerations on models ex-
plaining the behaviour of the inflation rate. In this case, two approaches are considered.
The first is the mark-up approach that attributes price changes to demand and cost
factors (Bronfenbrenner and Holzman 1963). Since the traditional separation between
cost push and demand pull is controversial, we take both aspects into account (Laidler
and Parkin 1975). This approach results in the determination of a measure of capacity
utilisation to capture the demand situation, and the import price index and unit labour
costs to depict cost components serving as explanatory variables for inflation. The sec-
ond approach, the P-Star model, relies on the quantity theory of money. It contains a
simple monetary model as well as an expectations-augmented Phillips curve for special
cases (Lee 1999). The generalised form of the model contains the price gap that can
be reduced to its component parts: the liquidity and the output gap (Svensson 2000).
This approach ultimately results in money growth and some measure of potential output
serving as explanatory variables.
Since we are not interested in discriminating between different models to explain inflation
but rather in the determination of potential influences on the short-term difference be-
tween inflation and inflation expectations, we extract the following variables as candidates
for influencing the inflation formation process:3 We test three different measures of ca-
pacity utilisation, namely the unemployment rate measured as a percentage of the labour
force, u, the economic sentiment indicator published by the European Commission, esi,
in the form 100[indicator −mean(indicator)]/mean(indicator), and the annual growth
rate of industrial production, ∆ip. To discriminate between the three possible measures,
we rely on information criteria. For all tested specifications, the equations including the
economic sentiment indicator are chosen by the information criteria. Therefore, we always
use the sentiment indicator in the final estimation equation. For the cost push, we use
the annual percentage price change of raw materials excluding energy, pirawexcl, and the oil
price, oil. Additionally, the annual growth rate of the real effective exchange rate, ∆ereal,
hints at the competitiveness of the European economy. Furthermore, we consider annual
3For an alternative approach determining influences on inflation expectations formation see Gerberding
(2001).
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money growth M3, ∆m3, in the form of the centred three month moving average. These
data seem to be a reasonable collection of time series that are also used in the literature
to explain inflation expectations (see e.g. Pesaran 1987, Gramlich 1983, Johnson 1997 or
Ball and Croushore 2003).
One problem in the use of time series in estimations where the behaviour of economic
agents and their information set matter is the revision of the series. Given that expec-
tations are based on the knowledge at the time when expectations are formed, the use
of revised data to uncover the relationship between the macroeconomic variables and ex-
pectations formation seems to be problematic. Therefore, we use data collected from the
Monthly Bulletins of the ECB to obtain time series that reflect as closely as possible the
knowledge of the financial market experts at the time of expectations formation.4 The
time series span the period from January 1999 to June 2007. For further description of
the data, see appendix.
With regard to the time series characteristics, we test for a unit root. The choice of the
maximum lag length is made as the integer part of 12(T/100)1/4 (see Hayashi 2000, p.
594). With about 98 observation, this gives a maximum of 12 lags for all analysed time
series. Due to the improved finite-sample properties compared to the original ADF test,
we use the ADF-GLS test of Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996). One question to be
addressed concerns the inclusion of deterministic terms in the test equation. In deciding
whether to incorporate a constant and a trend, we rely on a graphical inspection of the
GLS detrended series compared to the actual series used. We do not expect a trend in
either of the series. However, since the matter is not unambiguously clear, we test the
series with and without a trend (see Table 6 in the appendix).
We can reject the unit root unambiguously for the wording indicator and the monthly
change of the unemployment rate. The exchange rate variable, the interest rate and
the annual change of industrial production show ambiguous results. However, for these
time series, the assumption of a time trend is not reasonable. In this case, we reject the
4Since the estimation equation includes lags of the explanatory variables, vintage data would be
needed.
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hypotheses of a unit root for the annual percentage change of the real effective exchange
rate, the interest rate and industrial production. For all other time series, the unit root
could not be rejected. Whenever the theoretical model gives the estimation equation in
level form, we take first differences of the time series where the unit root could not be
rejected. The same procedure applies for the inclusion of the exogenous variables in the
VECM approach.
The estimation results as well as the test statistics are displayed in Table 1. Both es-
timation approaches for both expectations series perform reasonably well. First, the
relationship between the expected and the realised inflation rate is close to one for ex-
pectations calculated with constant thresholds as the VECM approach shows. For the
variable threshold expectations, the relationship is not as close but still considerably high.
A Trace test as well as a Eigenvalue test indicate a cointegration relationship between
expected and realised inflation for both expectations series if the exogenous variables are
included. Next, the lagged difference between inflation and expectations in the level spec-
ification is significant as well. But in contrast to the theoretical model, the coefficient is
below unity.
The additional explanatory variables show a convincing pattern. Whereas the level spec-
ification leaves us with an influence of the annual percentage change of raw materials ex-
cluding energy and the economic sentiment indicator, the interest rate and the economic
sentiment have an impact on inflation when using the VECM approach. First, the annual
change of the raw material prices without energy significantly reduces the gap between
expected and realised inflation. This influence disappears in the VECM approach and
is therefore not attributable to a reaction of the inflation rate or inflation expectations.
The economic sentiment indicator also leads to a reduction of the gap between realised
and expected inflation. As the VECM estimation shows, this reaction is attributable to
a reaction of expected inflation; a higher economic sentiment indicator leads to higher
expected inflation whereas the inflation rate does not react to this variable in a significant
way.
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After controlling for influences of the other macroeconomic variables known at the time
of expectations formation, the wording indicator exerts a significant influence on the
gap between expected and realised inflation where the effect is more pronounced for
expectations with variable thresholds. A higher hawkishness in the rhetoric would lead
to a lower gap between the two series. Surprisingly, the higher indicator does not seem to
be attributable to a reaction of expectations but rather to a adjustment of the inflation
rate as the VECM approach shows. Increasing risks to price stability communicated by
the central bank would then lead to lower inflation in six months. One interpretation is
that the communication of the risk leads to precautionary reactions of economic agents
and the risks do not materialise. To investigate this matter further, we take a closer look
at expectations formation in the following section.
Even after controlling for the contemporaneous effect of macroeconomic variables besides
the wording indicator, it could be that the communication of the central bank only sum-
marizes past developments of these variables. To estimate the informational content of the
wording indicator beyond the past macroeconomic development, we add two additional
lags of the wording indicator and the other explanatory variables (see Table 2 where the
significant lags are displayed). On re-estimating the level equation as well as the VECM
with the additional lags, we again find an influence of the economic sentiment indicator,
the interest rate and the annual price change of raw materials and, in addition to that,
of the oil price change. However, the impact of ECB communication on inflation expec-
tations changes. Whereas the gap between actual and expected inflation for constant
thresholds does not seem to react to the wording indicator anymore, the VECM approach
still displays a significant influence of communication. In contrast to the previous results,
the indicator now influences inflation expectations in a positive way. As it is more plausi-
ble that communication drives expectations and not realised inflation, this result confirms
the need for further analysis to shed light on the expectations formation process.
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Table 1: Estimation results for the gap between expected and realised inflation.
Level equation VECM
Adj. sample: 1999:12 - 2007:06 2000:04-2007:06
Dependent var. pit − pit|t−6 ∆pit ∆pit|t−6 ∆pit ∆pit|t−6
Threshold constant variable constant variable
pit−1 − pit−1|t−7 0.65 0.66
(9.06) (10.71)
Adjustment -0.31 0.10 -0.16 0.15
coeff. (-2.94) (3.20) (-2.95) (3.35)
Cointegration -0.97 -0.89
coeff. (-10.54) (-7.12)
wdt−6 -0.09 -0.18 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.04
(-1.66) (-2.62) (-2.08) (1.36) (-2.02) (1.37)
it−6 0.002 -0.004 0.01 -0.003 0.01 -0.01
(0.25) (-0.33) (0.98) (-1.15) (0.91) (-1.95)
∆oilt−6 0.002 -0.01 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(0.21) (-0.96) (-0.11) (0.24) (-0.16) (0.45)
∆pirawexclt−6 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.90) (-2.26) (-1.09) (-0.97) (-1.58) (-1.43)
∆erealt−6 -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 0.0004 -0.001 0.001
(-1.00) (-1.06) (-1.32) (0.41) (-0.46) (0.46)
∆esit−6 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04
(-1.32) (-3.41) (0.80) (2.57) (-0.55) (2.88)
∆m3t−6 -0.01 -0.002 -0.05 0.0004 -0.04 0.03
(-0.12) (-0.02) (-0.60) (0.02) (-0.43) (0.46)
R
2
0.51 0.75 0.30 0.93 0.24 0.59
LM test (2 lags) 7.30 2.37 3.48 6.80
(0.03) (0.31) (0.48) (0.15)
LM test (6 lags) 19.20 21.95 2.91 4.94
(0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.29)
Heteroscedasticity 35.56 40.09 37.12 64.66 22.71 60.65
test (White) (0.48) (0.29) (0.60) (0.01) (0.89) (0.00)
Normality test 3.24 0.51 9.65 2.10 30.20 3.12
(Jarque Bera) (0.20) (0.77) (0.01) (0.35) (0.00) (0.21)
Newey-West HAC standard
errors and covariance
Short-run
dynamics:
∆pit−i,∆pit−i|t−6−i,
i = 1− 3, 5− 7
Short-run
dynamics:
∆pit−i,∆pit−i|t−6−i,
i = 1, 5− 7
Note: t statistic for coefficients in parenthesis, bold numbers indicate significance at least at the ten
percent level.
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Table 2: Estimation results for the gap between expected and realised inflation.
Level equation VECM
Adj. sample: 2000:02 - 2007:06 2000:04-2007:06
Dependent var. pit − pit|t−6 ∆pit ∆pit|t−6 ∆pit ∆pit|t−6
Threshold constant variable constant variable
pit−1 − pit−1|t−7 0.66 0.61
(6.67) (7.87)
Adjustment -0.32 0.09 -0.19 0.12
coeff. (-2.59) (2.67) (-2.63) (2.14)
Cointegration -0.99 -0.96
coeff. (-8.26) (-5.24)
wdt−6 -0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.09
(-1.80) (-0.66) (2.29) (-0.17) (2.36)
wdt−8 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.40) (-1.75)
it−6 0.50 0.39
(2.13) (1.69)
it−8 0.001 0.13 0.04 0.27
(0.00) (2.35) (0.22) (1.73)
∆oilt−6
∆oilt−7 -0.03 -0.03
(-2.55) (-2.71)
∆pirawexclt−7 0.02 0.0003 0.01 0.001
(2.07) (0.18) ( 1.93) (0.27)
∆pirawexclt−8 0.01 0.0004 0.01 0.005
(1.78) (0.26) (1.72) (1.01)
∆esit−6 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.03
(-2.32) (-3.41) (-0.67) (2.40) (-1.67) (2.19)
∆esit−7 -0.04 -0.01
(-2.25) (-0.91)
∆esit−8 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
(1.11) (3.61) (1.13) (2.35)
∆m3t−8 -0.22 -0.26 -0.10 0.14
(-2.07) (-2.33) (-0.96) (1.72)
R
2
0.53 0.76 0.34 0.95 0.35 0.65
LM test (2 lags) 8.51 7.91 5.67 7.26
(0.01) (0.02) (0.23) (0.12)
LM test (6 lags) 14.22 17.10 3.86 2.70
(0.03) (0.01) (0.42) (0.61)
Heteroscedasticity 39.91 57.46 60.88 73.67 52.32 77.18
test (White) (0.65) (0.08) (0.72) (0.30) (0.75) (0.07)
Normality test 0.84 0.21 14.35 8.53 10.20 3.48
(Jarque Bera) (0.66) (0.90) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.18)
Newey-West HAC standard
errors and covariance
Short-run
dynamics:
∆pit−i,∆pit−i|t−6−i,
i = 1− 3, 5− 7
Short-run
dynamics:
∆pit−i,∆pit−i|t−6−i,
i = 1, 5− 7
Note: t statistic for coefficients in parenthesis, bold numbers indicate significance at least at the ten
percent level.
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5 Explicit Modelling of Inflation Expectations
The theoretical model as well as the estimation results for the gap between expected
and realised inflation suggest taking a closer look at the expectations formation process.
Two kinds of expectations formation processes can basically be distinguished; rational or
forward-looking expectations and adaptive or backward-looking expectations formation.
More formally, inflation expectations formed in period t for time t+s can be described as
the expected value of the inflation rate conditional on the information set, Ω, available at
time t. This information set includes private as well as public information. If we assume
that part of the individuals form expectations rationally and others employ adaptive
expectations formation, the series of inflation expectations could be displayed as the
weighted average of both parts
pit+s|t = ρE[pit+s|Ωt] + (1− ρ)E[pit+s|St] (16)
where ρ gives the relative weight of these two formation processes. The information set
St for forming adaptive expectations is only part of the public information set, St ⊆ Ωt,
that is used in case of rational expectations (Pesaran and Weale 2006, p. 720-721).
Since we are interested in the explicit representation of expectations formation, we have
to find a suitable form to express forward-looking expectations whereas for the adaptive
part, we rely on the usual expressions determined by past values of the inflation rate
and inflation expectations. For the part of rational expectations, we assume that the
information set contains a number of time series, v, that give signals with respect to
the future inflation rate. In this case, and under the additional assumption of normally
distributed random variables, we obtain the regression equation
E[pit+s|v] = E[pit]−
p∑
i=1
αiE[vi,t] +
p∑
i=1
αivi,t + e (17)
limiting the number of explanatory variables to p (Graybill 1961, p. 62-67).
To include additional explanatory variables in the traditional models explaining expec-
tations formation, we need to test whether there is indeed a part of forward-looking
expectations formation. If there are no forward-looking expectations present, we could
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rely solely on the lagged inflation rate and lagged inflation expectations to determine
expectations formation. In a first step we therefore estimate the traditional model of
expectations formation (Model I):
pit+6|t = c1
[
pit|t−6 + c2∆epit+5|t−1 + c3(pit − pit−6) + c4(pit − pit|t−6)
]
+(1− c1)pit+6 + ²t (18)
where part of the expectations with regard to inflation are allowed to be formed six months
ahead. In the estimation approach, the expected value of the inflation rate is replaced
by the realisation of the inflation rate and estimation is carried out using instrument
variables. As the calculation of the expectations series heavily depends on the choice of
perceived inflation, we estimate equation (18) with the expected change of the inflation
rate as the direct outcome of transforming qualitative survey answers into quantitative
expectations as a robustness check. In this case, Model I becomes
∆epit+6|t = c1
[
c2∆
epit+5|t−1 + c3(pit − pit−6) + (c4 − 1)(pit − pit|t−6)
]
+(1− c1) (pit+6 − pit) + ²t. (19)
For the backward-looking part of expectations formation, it is possible to allow for three
different approaches (Pesaran 1984). First, expectations can be formed regressively. This
would include the lagged change of expectations, that we adapt to be the lagged expected
change of expectations, ∆epit+5|t−1. The second approach assumes that expectations for-
mation can be oriented towards the change of actual inflation over the last six months,
(pit − pit−6). The third approach would be an adaptive part that allows for the correction
of the last known expectations error, (pit−pit|t−6). We include all three possibilities in the
equation.
If the forward-looking part is significant and cannot be neglected, we can proceed by
explicitly modelling expectations formation. To identify the set of explanatory variables
for the forward-looking part of expectations formation, we rely on the same thoughts as
those determining the variables that influence the difference between inflation and inflation
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expectations. In this case, the original estimation equation transforms into Model II given
by
pit+6|t = c1
[
pit|t−6 + c2∆epit+5|t−1 + c3(pit − pit−6) + c4(pit − pit|t−6)
]
+(1− c1)
[
c5 + c6wdt +
∑
i
c6+ivi,t
]
+ ²t (20)
Once again, we have the expected change of inflation as dependent variable to check the
robustness of the estimation. The equivalent change of the estimation equation results in
the following terms:
∆epit+6|t = c1
[
c2∆pit+5|t−1 + c3(pit − pit−6) + (c4 − 1)(pit − pit|t−6)
]
+(1− c1)
[
c5 + c6wdt +
∑
i
c6+ivi,t − pit
]
+ ²t. (21)
With regard to the estimation strategy of Model I, Two Stage Least Squares estimation is
used because the value of the inflation rate in t+6 is not known in t. Since we follow the
errors-in-variables approach to replace expected inflation with realised inflation six months
ahead, we need a list of reasonable instruments (Blake 1991). This list includes only
contemporaneous and lagged inflation but does not contain lagged inflation expectations
because the survey data may measure inflation expectations with error. The test for over-
identifying restrictions shows that the instruments seem to be valid and the specification
of the equation is reasonable (see Table 3). Moreover, the estimation has to deal with
the fact that the time horizon for expectations is six months. Therefore, the time period
of expectations formations differs from the monthly frequency of the survey. This would
generate serial correlation that has to be taken into account by using robust standard
errors when estimating the model.
The estimation results show that an important part of expectations formation can be
regarded as backward-looking. Depending on the specification, this part reaches up to
89 percent but is still significantly different from unity for the constant threshold ex-
pectations. The adaptive part splits into the correction of the last known expectations
error and the adjustment to the development of realised inflation. In addition to this,
expectations formation seems to be sluggish as the significance of the inclusion of the
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expected change of the inflation rate of the preceding month shows. Rearranging terms
and exploiting the fact that c2 and c4 are not significantly different from unity results in
the following expectations formation for the adaptive part, exemplary for the constant
threshold variant:
pit+6|t = pit+5|t−1 + (pit − pit−1)− 0.25∆epit|t−6 (22)
In this case, economic agents take the previous month’s expected inflation rate as a basis
and add the change of the inflation rate. This is corrected by the expected change of the
inflation rate anticipated six months before. When modeling the forward-looking part of
expectations formation explicitly in Model II, almost the same structure arises. However,
the adaptive part is now dominated by the previous month’s expected change of inflation
and the previous month’s one to one correction of the expectations error. This results in
a static expectations formation process, where the previous month’s expected change is
now added to the last known inflation rate,
pit+6|t = pit+5|t−1 +∆epit+5|t. (23)
However, the explicit inclusion of macroeconomic variables receives a significant weight.
With regard to the influence of the various macroeconomic variables, monetary policy
seems to have no influence. The time horizon of expectations formation appears to be
too short to detect an observable effect of money growth as well as interest rate deci-
sions. Surprisingly, no other variable besides the oil price change with regard to constant
threshold expectations exerts a significant influence when the wording indicator is incor-
porated into the estimation. Without the wording indicator, inflation expectations would
be higher when the economic sentiment increases and when the oil price displays a positive
change compared to the preceding month. In addition to this, a higher annual change of
raw material prices without energy have a negative impact on variable threshold inflation
expectations.
The wording indicator displays a significantly positive influence on inflation expectations.
A higher indicator leads to higher inflation expectations. This shows that financial market
experts believe in the risks to price stability that are communicated by the central bank.
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Even if there is no reaction to an interest rate decision, this result does not necessarily
interfere with the credibility of the central bank. The expectations formation horizon of
expert is too short to allow for effects from interest rate decisions at the time expectations
are formed. However, because it cannot be excluded that the indicator could be seen as a
summary measure for other variables that influence expectations. To explore this idea, we
use two additional lags of the wording indicator and the other explanatory variables once
again in the Model II estimations (see Table 3 for estimation results indicating only signif-
icant variables). The estimations change the previously obtained results in the following
way. In this case, not only the change of the oil price, but also the economic sentiment
indicator affects expectations in a significant way and with the expected sign. Further-
more, the wording indicator does not have a significant influence on variable threshold
expectations anymore.
On interpreting the empirical evidence, there are hints that the wording indicator seems
to work as a summary of information contained in the macroeconomic variables, espe-
cially the economic sentiment indicator, that could influence inflation. This assumption
is supported when taking a look at the estimation including additional lags of the ex-
planatory variables such that the economic sentiment and the oil price are now significant
compared to the estimations where only contemporaneous variables are used. In addition
to this, communication measured with the wording indicator seems to influence expecta-
tions formation more directly. The results are not sufficiently robust to draw unambiguous
conclusions about the influence of the indicator on the gap between realised and expected
inflation.
The overall results with regard to expectations formation are in line with answers of
financial market experts to a number of special questions asked within the framework of
the Financial Market Test in March 2006 (ZEW Finanzmarktreport, Volume 14, March
2006). A large proportion of experts (62.3 percent) evaluates the communication of the
ECB as clear or very clear. The statements of the ECB also play a role in forecasting
macroeconomic variables. If the statements are considered, they mainly influence inflation
expectations, followed by the exchange rate and long-run interest rates. Around 40 percent
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of the experts take statements of the ECB into account when forecasting inflation under
the condition that the rhetoric is regarded when forecasting macroeconomic variables.
Table 3: Estimation results for explicit expectations formation.
Model I Model II
Adj. sample 1999:09-2007:06 1999:08-2007:06 1999:08-2007:06
Threshold constant variable constant variable constant variable constant variable
Dependent var. pit+6|t pit+6|t ∆epit+6|t ∆epit+6|t pit+6|t pit+6|t pit+6|t pit+6|t
c1 0.86 0.68 0.89 0.72 0.89 0.77 0.90 0.79
(14.28) (3.55) (15.18) (3.64) (40.56) (13.89) (34.71) (10.82)
c2 1.11 1.37 1.13 1.36 0.86 1.03 0.85 1.03
(13.03) (4.89) (20.63) (5.46) (16.04) (13.13) (12.99) (9.26)
c3 -0.25 -0.33 -0.25 -0.34 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.17
(-1.93) (-2.07) (-2.69) (-2.27) (-1.33) (-1.20) (-2.27) (-2.92)
c4 1.23 1.20 1.21 1.24 1.06 1.06 1.07 1.03
(6.97) (4.75) (10.04) (5.48) (25.23) (19.50) (27.62) (24.26)
constant 2.52 2.77 2.58 2.89
(9.17) (7.19) (8.58) (6.64)
wdt 0.27 0.28 0.30
(2.73) (2.07) (1.68)
it -0.09 -0.15
(-1.04) (-1.27)
∆oilt 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
(1.84) (1.60) (2.37) (1.81)
∆pirawexclt -0.01 -0.03
(-0.89) (-1.43)
∆erealt -0.02 -0.02
(-1.41) (-1.10)
∆esit 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.12
(1.63) (1.41) (2.49) (2.00)
∆esit−2 0.14 0.14
(2.54) (1.95)
∆m3t -0.16 -0.13
(0.81) (-0.49)
R
2
0.94 0.84 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.89 0.97 0.90
LM test(2 lags) 21.82 19.27 17.82 17.11 5.16 8.22 1.26 2.13
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.02) (0.53) (0.35)
LM test(6 lags) 24.56 22.39 20.35 20.88 10.84 12.77 8.60 4.92
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.05) (0.20) (0.55)
Jarque Bera 5.65 8.40 7.30 15.89 12.76 102.32 23.02 70.40
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White test 12.31 26.88 9.67 29.24 89.59 92.37 59.92 65.39
(0.26) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.07)
Test c1 = 1 4.75 2.69 3.21 1.93 25.06 17.85 15.67 7.97
(0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Test of overid. 0.02 0.86 0.89 1.65
restrictions (0.88) (0.35) (0.64) (0.44)
Instruments constant, pit pit−1, constant, pit pit−1, pit−2,
pit−7, pit−8 pit−6, pit−7
Note: Newey-West HAC standard errors (lag truncation=3); t-statistic for coefficients in parenthesis,
bold numbers indicate significance at least at the ten percent level
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6 Conclusion
The conduct of monetary policy has seen a change towards increased transparency in the
past years and in the course of this development, the communication strategy of central
banks is attracting increasing attention. For the ECB in particular with its complex two
pillar strategy and its definition of price stability, it is crucial that the public understands
monetary policy decisions and strategy. The literature focuses to a large extent on the
short-run effects of communication and comes to the conclusion that the interest rate de-
cisions of the ECB are predictable to a large extent. Whereas the monetary policy of the
ECB is well understood in this respect, the influence of communication on inflation expec-
tations is not equally well investigated. We contribute to the literature by investigating
the influence of the informational content of the ECB Presidents’ statements on inflation
expectations. To measure expectations, we use inflation expectations of financial market
experts provided by the ZEW Financial Markets Test. Even if the qualitative answers of
the survey have to be transformed into a quantitative time series of expectations, they
provide a more direct measure of expectations than the extraction from interest rates.
The informational content of ECB communication is not directly observable either. It is
captured by a wording indicator and the question whether there is a significant influence
on inflation expectations formation and whether there is a difference between the inflation
rate and inflation expectations is analysed.
As the estimations reveal, there is a significant influence of the wording indicator on in-
flation expectations whereas the impact on the gap between inflation expectations and
realised inflation does not seem to lead to unambiguous conclusions. A possible interpreta-
tion is that the rhetoric of the ECB communicates risks to price stability in a credible way
and that financial market experts react to the announcements by adjusting their inflation
expectations. The influence arises because the indicator seems to summarise information
that would otherwise be provided by different macroeconomic variables that are publicly
available. The question whether the communication measure has an independent impact
that goes beyond publicly available information contained in macroeconomic time series
calls for further investigation.
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Appendix
Construction of the Indicator
Table 4: Phrases counted in the ECB president’s statements.
Further information F-Test η2 sign
and explanation (all cate-
gories)
appropriate(ly) 2.62 (0.09) 0.13 -1.00
inappropriate or ”not appropriate”; used in connec-
tion with actions as well as assessment
of developments
0.76 (0.47) 0
in line used as assessment; not counted when
used in connection with the Stability
and Growth pact
0.94 (0.40) 0
not in line 2.46 (0.10) 0.12 1.00
for the time being or ”at present”, ”at the moment” 0.96 (0.39) 0
to monitor closely or ”to monitor carefully” 5.46 (0.01) 0.23 -1.00
vigilant or ”vigilance”, ”alert” 5.87 (0.01) 0.25 1.00
risks to price stabil-
ity
or ”inflationary risk”, ”inflationary
pressure”
3.23 (0.05) 0.15 1.00
no risk for price sta-
bility
or ”no inflationary risk”, ”no inflation-
ary pressure”; definite negation
1.63 (0.21) 0
risks in connection with all other assessments 0.99 (0.38) 0
no risk in connection with all other assessments 1.37 (0.27) 0
upside or ”upward” 3.05 (0.06) 0.15 1.00
no upside or ”no upward”; definite negation 0.21 (0.81) 0
downward or ”downside” 1.45 (0.25) 0
no downward or ”downside”; definite negation 0.21 (0.81) 0
balanced or ”no upward or downward pressure” 0.95 (0.40) 0
slowdown 5.90 (0.01) 0.25 -1.00
second-round
effects
0.04 (0.96) 0
mixed 0.67 (0.52) 0
favourable in the assessment of the outlook for
price stability
1.36 (0.27) 0
favourable in connection with all other assessments
besides price stability
3.45 (0.04) 0.16 1.00
unfavourable or ”not favourable” 2.29 (0.12) 0
compatible or ”consistent” 0.26 (0.77) 0
not compatible or ”not consistent”; definite negation 0.76 (0.47) 0
consistently 0.76 (0.47) 0
Number of words 0.53 (0.59) 0
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Table 5: Phrases and test results for the frequencies.
F-test F-test F-test Mean Mean Mean
(increasing
to un-
changed
interest
rate)
(decreasing
to un-
changed
interest
rate)
(decreasing
to in-
creasing
interest
rate)
(increasing
interest
rate)
(unchanged
interest
rate)
(decreasing
interest
rate)
appropriate(ly) 3.96
(0.06)
0.50
(0.49)
7.50
(0.02)
0.14 0.74 1.00
inappropriate
in line
not in line 4.24
(0.05)
- (-) 0.69
(0.42)
0.29 0.00 0.00
for the time being
to monitor closely 0.00
(0.95)
11.63
(0.00)
4.46
(0.06)
0.57 0.56 1.60
vigilant 7.91
(0.01)
1.64
(0.21)
7.50
(0.02)
0.86 0.26 0.00
risks to price stability 4.83
(0.04)
0.56
(0.46)
5.84
(0.04)
5.43 3.52 2.80
no risk for price stability
risks
no risk
upside 4.07
(0.05)
1.03
(0.32)
5.08
(0.05)
4.86 2.89 1.80
no upside
downward
no downward
balanced
slowdown 4.07
(0.05)
4.45
(0.04)
62.22
(0.00)
0.00 0.70 1.60
second-round effects
mixed
favourable
favourable 6.25
(0.02)
0.09
(0.76)
3.13
(0.11)
2.29 1.15 1.00
unfavourable
compatible
not compatible
consistently
Number of words
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Data Description
The unemployment rate measured as a percentage of the labour force is seasonally ad-
justed. The data are released with a lag of 2 months as a rule, so that in January for
example, the value of November of the previous year is known. However, sometimes only
the value of the previous month was published in the Monthly Bulletin and in the follow-
ing month two new values were published to keep on track with the two month publication
lag. This occurred ten times in the above-mentioned period. We construct a series that
captures the knowledge of an observer displaying the latest available unemployment rate
at that time.
The annual percentage change of the real effective exchange rate is used in the narrow
definition of trading partners of the euro area. It has a publication lag of one month due
to an adjustment to price changes. There are some special features in this series. For
January 1999, the value is calculated from the respective exchange rate indices published
in the February 1999 Monthly Bulletin. For the period before April 2000, the effective
exchange rate change is published for the countries that are also individually displayed in
the Monthly Bulletin. Since April 2000 it is a narrow group of 23 trading partners. The
values for January 2001 to December 2001 are calculated using the Table ‘Past data for
selected economic indicators for the euro area plus Greece’.
For money growth M3, the value for the centred three month moving average was first
published in August 2001 (May 2001 value). For the period of January 1999 to April
2001, the values are calculated from the seasonally adjusted index of M3, first published
in August 1999 (May 1999 value). For the period of January 1999 to April 1999, the data
are calculated using the index values taken from the August 1999 Monthly Bulletin. The
publication lag is four months.
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Table 6: ADF-GLS test the time series potentially included in the regressions.
Sample Test statistics
without trend with trend
Money M3 1999:05-2007:06 −0.65A −2.53B
(annual growth rate) ∆m3
Exchange rate 1999:05-2007:06 −2.14A,∗∗ −2.23C
(annual growth rate) ∆ereal
Economic sentiment esi 1999:02-2007:06 −1.34A −1.30C
Unemployment rate u 1999:01-2007:06 1.65A −0.92C
Change of the unemployment rate ∆u 1999:02-2007:06 −6.57A,∗∗∗ −6.46C,∗∗∗
Oil price oil 1999:02-2007:06 0.17A −1.87C
Prices of raw materials excl. energy 1999:01-2007:06 −0.85A −1.71C
(annual growth rate) pirawexcl
Prices of raw materials 1999:01-2007:06 −1.28A −1.60C
(annual growth rate) piraw
Industrial production 1999:01-2007:06 −2.12A,∗∗ −2.23C
(annual growth rate) ∆ip
Inflation rate pi 1999:01-2007:06 −1.17A −1.85C
Expected inflation rate pit|t−6 1999:02-2007:06 −1.10A −2.72C
(constant thresholds)
Expected inflation rate pit|t−6 1999:01-2007:06 −0.85A −2.19C
(variable thresholds)
Interest rate i 1999:01-2007:06 −2.25A,∗∗ −2.32C
Wording indicator wd 1999:01-2007:06 −2.02A,∗∗ −5.17C,∗∗∗
Critical values
A: 10% level: -1.61; 5% level: -1.94; 1% level: -2.59
B: 10% level: -2.75; 5% level: -3.04; 1% level: -3.60
C: 10% level: -2.74; 5% level: -3.03; 1% level: -3.58
Critical values for the test including a trend are provided by EViews interpolating the critical
values of ERS. For the test equation including only a constant but no deterministic trend,
McKinnon (1996) critical values are applied.
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